Two oil price shocks changed the pattern of cheap oil. The first was the Arab embargo on oil exports in 1973. Oil prices rose five fold. In 1978, the second was the fall of Shah Iran. Prices soared to $80-$100 a barrel in today's prices. In 1960, OPEC was established and since then it has been a considerable political and economical force in the oil market. Two thirds of the world's oil reserves belong to OPEC members. OPEC is accused of being responsible for most of the price increases due to their production cuts and market power. This paper provides a general framework to examine the role of OPEC in affecting oil prices through the extracted quantities. A mathematical model is developed to explore the objective function of OPEC, which includes economic and political considerations. The idea is that OPEC members consider both the political support of their citizens and profits when determining oil extraction rates. This support is represented by a -harm function‖ which was added to the objective function of OPEC. The solution of the model lends some support for inclusion of this harm function, through which OPEC benefits from the cuts in production aimed at harming the western countries. For this harm function to be meaningful empirically, OPEC members should have a high harm indicator, α t . With high harm indicator values, OPEC harms itself financially. The results suggest that OPEC appears to be accepting considerable monetary setbacks to appease its citizens' taste for harming the West. At different discount rates, the monetary losses range from about 10-20%. Solving the mathematical model required estimation of the residual demand that OPEC faces plus the cost function that applies to OPEC production. This paper reports the results of these estimations.
I. Introduction
OPEC represents a considerable political and economic force. Two-thirds of the oil reserves in the world belong to OPEC members; likewise, OPEC members are responsible for half of the world's oil exports. According to its statutes, OPEC's main goal is to unify and protect the interests of oil-producing countries. It allows oil-producing countries to guarantee their income by coordinating policies and prices among members. OPEC is the best known cartel in the world which controls the oil market by limiting production, thus creating -shortages‖ and forcing oil prices up.
Oil is the world's main source of energy, and its price has a substantial impact on all However, since then, oil prices have declined. Figure 1 summarizes the time trend in oil prices.
When we look at the trend of oil prices over the past years, one would argue that OPEC is responsible for most of these increases due to their production cuts and market power. Others believe that OPEC is not to be blamed for the price increases, since OPEC's ability to control the price of oil diminished somewhat after the 1973 oil crisis, due to the subsequent discovery and development of large oil reserves in the Gulf of Mexico and the North Sea, the opening up of Russia, and market modernization.
Figure 1
There is a rich literature on the process of oil price determination, but the question of whether OPEC is a cartel or not remains hotly debated. Economists have devoted much attention to this issue, since it reflects different arguments regarding OPEC's role in determining oil prices. Some economists have assumed OPEC as a monopolist and others use models that regard OPEC as a dominant firm. 1 In this paper, OPEC is assumed to act as a dominant firm, and non-OPEC countries are regarded as fringe firms. The main concern here is to explore the objective function for OPEC, and how OPEC determines the time path of production. This is done by applying optimal control theory in studying the dynamics of oil prices and therefore the time path of quantities extracted. We develop a model that explores the objective function of OPEC, which includes economic as well as political considerations. We determine the optimal extraction quantities of oil under this model, and compare them to actual quantities to check the validity of the model. Also we provide policy guidance to decision makers around the world.
The paper aims to contribute to a further understanding of the real dynamics of OPEC production behavior and its impacts on the world oil market. It contributes to the literature in several ways. From a technical standpoint, one of the important additions is the estimation of the residual demand curve for oil that OPEC faces in the market. Previous economic studies that have applied optimal control theory have not used any specific estimated demand equation, but rather employed general demand equations to show analytical solutions. Non-optimal control models though did estimate different types of demand functions, using lagged prices and/or lagged quantities. However, these exercises in econometrics appear to have little or no foundation in traditional demand theory.
It also provides estimates of the oil production cost function for OPEC members, which has not been done previously. The estimation of both the demand function and the cost function for OPEC allows one to apply the mathematical model that is developed here using optimal control theory. Finally, another important addition is the test of political economic 4 considerations. The test looks at the hypothesis that OPEC has another objective, beyond just maximizing profits, in deciding on extracted quantities of oil. This other goal is the desire to achieve political support among citizens of OPEC countries. This support comes from the level of harm or damage to western countries' economies, by affecting the world oil market through high oil prices.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section II reviews the literature.
Section III describes the theoretical model and assumptions used in estimating the residual demand for oil and the cost function for OPEC. Section IV describes the theoretical optimal control model and the solution of this model. Finally, Section V summarizes the main findings of the research and offers some concluding remarks
II. Literature Review
Since 1973, economists have devoted considerable attention to analyzing how oil prices are determined. This previous work has generally focused on two theoretical approaches, either the optimal control analysis of pricing of a depletable resource, or OPEC as a monopolist setting oil prices to maximize net present value. The methodologies employed in these studies include:
the theory of exhaustible resources; game theory; simulation; industrial economics; and the economic efficiency hypothesis (Mabro; 1992). Griffin and Xiong (1997) examined OPEC's production behavior when some members cheat on quotas. MacAvoy (1982) used market fundamentals (demand and supply) to explain changes in oil prices. Griffin (1985) expanded the analysis by looking at four different production models for OPEC members using data for the period 1971-1983. These models are the competitive; cartel; target revenue; and property rights models. Jones (1990) updated Griffin's cartel and competitive models using data from 1983 to 1988. Due to the limitation that Griffin's analysis covered a period when oil prices increased, and because the rapid growth of non-OPEC supply after 1988 was accompanied by the rapid decline in oil prices during the 1980's and 1990's, Watkins and Streifel (1998) renewed interest in the competitive model of oil production.
The theory of exhaustible resources was pioneered by the work of Hotelling (1931) . He showed that the price of the resource minus the marginal cost should grow at a rate equal to the discount rate, under competitive markets and constant marginal extraction costs. This result is known as the -Hotelling rule‖. Extensions to Hotelling's model allowed for variable costs due to resource depletion and changing reserves. Pindyck (1978) allowed for exploration and variable average cost of production. Hotelling also extended the model by looking at monopolistic pricing compared to a competitive price Hotelling (1931) . Salant (1976) accounted for industrial organization of the world oil market by looking at fringe firms with the cartel. Stiglitz (1976) found that the monopolist's ability to use its market power depends on the price elasticity of demand. Polasky (1992) analyzed the value of information generated through exploration activity. The theory of exhaustible resources was also used in looking at the role of international trade in oil prices, since a great part of trade in natural resources is international in scope. This issue was investigated using models of resource-exporting countries. In these models, the resource-rich countries are assumed to maximize utility that is derived from consumption and they are constrained by the balance of payments. 2 Several attempts have been made to test the Hotelling rule; some show that the rule is a good depiction of the real world, and others question the reliability of the rule. Slade (1982) and Moazzami and Anderson (1994) found evidence that the price path follows a U-shape, and this means that resource prices will eventually increase, complying with the Hotelling rule. Krautkraemer (1998) Horn (2004) . Ramcharran (2001) tested this theory using data from 1973 to 2000 and concludes that it does not apply. Some attempts to define structural models of world oil prices were unsuccessful due to ignoring important factors that affect the behavior of world oil prices, such as political and military variables. 3 Smith (2005) rejected all traditional explanations of OPEC behavior (competitive, Cournot, dominant firm, etc.) in favor of a bureaucratic, consensus-making cartel hypothesis.
Political decisions may produce short-term deviations from the economic path. For example, destructive events, such as wars or revolutions, may remove capacity from production, and generate unexpected jumps in the price of oil. This is noticed in the oil market through the Iraq-Iran War, the Iranian Revolution, and the Gulf War. The behavior of OPEC in most cases is explained and tested using economic models that portray the behavior of economic agents. The fact that the cooperation within OPEC is among countries (members), not between firms, could cause these models to be incapable of fully explaining OPEC's behavior. Recognizing the fact that OPEC's members are national governments not private businesses requires that economic analysis of cartels must be blended with political analysis. The rationale of governments is different from the rationale of firms. Governments have a more complex set of interests and tend to emphasize security interests. Furthermore, governments are more complex organizations that contain more potential for internal conflicts over aims and means. Finally, governments have to pay attention to aspects at the social level in a way that firms do not (Willet, 1979). Wirl (2008) investigated different models that can help to explain oil price changes. One approach is political motives. This approach applies political reasoning to OPEC decision makers. The assumption is that politicians are much less concerned about profits than businessmen, since political markets may reward decisions that harm the economy. 4 Politicians must strive for At this point, a good question can be raised about the accuracy of this argument. Do OPEC members really seek to harm the U.S. and other Western countries by affecting the oil market and causing oil prices to increase? Do quota cuts, which OPEC members adopt in their meetings, reflect such a goal, or is it just a tool that used to maximize profit? These and other important questions will be addressed in this paper.
III. Residual Demand for Oil and the Cost Function for OPEC
In order to proceed empirically, we need to determine the residual demand function that OPEC faces, and estimate the cost function for OPEC's oil development and production. In this paper, it is assumed that OPEC's behavior follows the dominant firm model in the world oil market. The dominant firm model is used widely in economics (Salant (1976) , Cremer and Weitzman (1976) and Pindyck (1978) ). The model assumes that OPEC countries set the price of oil and the non-OPEC countries are the competitive fringe (assumed to be price takers). The demand for OPEC's oil is the -residual demand‖. By residual demand function we mean the relationship between OPEC's price and quantity, taking into account the competitive supply response of all non-OPEC countries to an OPEC-set price. 5 OECD countries, as a group, account for most imports of OPEC's oil. Table 1 summarizes the total exports of OPEC countries to the entire world and to OECD countries from 1960-2007. It shows that yearly exports to OECD countries average 72.2% of total OPEC exports. Table 1 
III.1 the Model of Residual Demand
. The approach used here to model the crude oil residual demand facing OPEC is to specify the major buyers or importers from OPEC, which are the OECD countries. Thus, the model splits the buyers from OPEC into two groups: OECD and non-OECD countries. It is important to emphasize that, in modeling the demand for OPEC producers' exports of crude oil, the research is modeling their net demand. Clearly, there are competing non-OPEC supplies of crude, but these will be assumed to be a function only of the prices set by the OPEC producers.
When these non-OPEC supplies are subtracted from the gross demands, which is assumed to be a function of OPEC prices and other exogenous variables, this results in a residual demand for OPEC's crude that is a function only of OPEC prices and the exogenous variables. Dahl (1994) reviews studies that estimate the demand for oil. Following the standard convention in these studies, the residual demand for oil can be represented by the following function:
Where, q t is OPEC's exports of crude oil (1000b/day), P t is real spot OPEC reference basket
population (in thousands), and q t-1 is lagged OPEC's exports of crude oil (1000b/day)
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The quantities here are OPEC's exports which are assumed to be the same as the quantities that OPEC produce.
The model here incorporates the demand of all countries, OECD and non-OECD. But because the research focuses on the relation between OPEC and OECD countries, the covariates are divided into OECD variables and non-OECD variables. This will help to see the differences in demand between the two groups. And also, will be seen later, non-OECD countries have a 
Where ε t is an error term.
To avoid identification problem, we also incorporate a linear supply function. The supply function can be identified by the following equation:
Where q t is OPEC's exports of crude oil (1000b/day), P t is real spot OPEC reference basket prices (base=2005), R t is OPEC's reserves, t is time index that is used to detrend the data and vt is an error term. Estimating demand function will be done using two-stage least-squares (2SLS).
III.1.1 Data
The data used in this section are taken from different sources. OPEC oil production, Table 2 reports the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of the variables. From the data we can graph the time path of OPEC's oil exports, quantities imported by OECD countries, quantities imported by non-OECD countries, and the real spot OPEC prices. Figures 2 and 3 report the time path of these movements. Table 2 Figures 2 and 3 Figure 2 shows that imports by OECD countries did dropped from 1979 to 1985, but since then there has been an upward trend in imports from OPEC. As for non-OECD countries, we see a stable pattern in their imports from OPEC. Figure 3 shows that real spot OPEC prices 6 
III.1.2. Results
In this section, the linear residual demand model is estimated and Table 3 reports the results. The regression coefficients have the expected signs. The estimate of the price coefficient is negative, indicating that the residual demand slopes downward (price and quantity demanded are inversely related). The coefficient is (-74.02) and significant. The estimates of the income coefficient for both OECD and non-OECD countries provide a reasonable picture of the income effect on the demand for oil. Both coefficients have a positive sign, although the coefficient for non-OECD countries is not significant, but it is highly significant for OECD countries. The estimate of the population coefficient for OECD countries is consistent with the economic theory and intuition (positive and highly significant). The increase in population over the years in OECD countries has generated higher rates of oil consumption. The estimate of the lagged demand coefficient is positive and highly significant. This indicates that the current demand is positively related to the last year's demand and perhaps reflecting peoples' habits over time.
With habit formation, current quantity depends not only on covariates like price, income, and population, but also on a "habit stock" formed by a lagged quantity (see, for example, Pollak (1970), and Abel (1990)). For a given level of current quantity, a habit formation causes consumers to adjust slowly to shocks in prices, income or population. 
The inverse demand function becomes: 
III.2. the Cost Function
The objective of this section is to estimate the cost function for OPEC's oil development and production. During the 1970s, the neoclassical cost function gained renewed popularity as a tool for estimating the structure of production. This surge of popularity is attributed to the widespread application of duality theory to economic analysis and the concomitant development of flexible functional forms.
III.2.1. the Model of the Cost Function
The cost function is one of the most useful concepts in economics. It is used conceptually in a variety of settings and is convenient in measuring many important economic concepts like efficiency; technical change; input substitution; economies of scale and more.
Since the development of the translogarithmic function by Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973), it has been used in production functions, cost functions and profit functions. The translog function has become an integral tool for analyzing the structure of many firms and industries in terms of production, cost and profits.
Consider the following cost function that attributes cost variation to a quantity effect and a time index that reflects the technology changes over time:
where (C t ) is the total cost, (q t ) is the output level, and (t) is a time index employed to measure technical change. Both the cost function and the production function in (5) are assumed to satisfy standard regularity conditions. Estimating Hotelling rents requires estimates of marginal costs. But as Adelman and Shahi (1989) noted, reliable, well-documented cost data are difficult to obtain for oil-exporting countries, and OPEC is no exception. For the sake of simplicity and for ease in computation of model solutions with optimal control theory, the estimated cost function is assumed to be quadratic.
C t = α 0 + α 1 q t + α 2 q t 2 + α 3 t + ε t (7)
III.2.2. Data
The econometric model is estimated with annual data on the oil development-operating cost estimates from 1955-85. The estimates used are from Adelman and Shahi (1989). They estimate adjusted development and operating cost ($/barrel) on an annual basis over the period 1955-1985 for 41 oil-producing countries including OPEC member countries, using U.S. drilling costs (in U.S. dollars per barrel) and publicly available data on drilling under particular assumptions. The estimates for each country vary from year to year, substantially in some cases.
They attribute these annual variations to reservoir depletion and to innovation in technology.
Smith (2005) also points out other sources of variation, like random fluctuations in drilling results, factor prices, and classification errors that affect the cost estimation process directly or indirectly. The cost estimates of Adelman and Shahi are then used to calculate the cost function for OPEC according to the production weights of its members. The major data problem was missing information. This issue was handled by estimating for every country the cost over the years 1955-1985 and then predicting the missing data 7 . OPEC oil production levels are reported in its Annual Statistical Bulletin for different years (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) . Table 4 reports the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of the variables used in this study. Table 4 III.2.3. Results Table 5 The residual demand curve, that OPEC faces in the market, and the cost function of oil production, that OPEC follows, have been estimated for the available data. The next chapter will use optimal control theory to represent the process that OPEC follows to decide on oil extraction levels that maximize its objective function.
IV. Optimal Control Model
Hotelling (1931) pioneered the theory of exhaustible resources. He demonstrated that, with competitive markets and constant marginal extraction costs, the price of the resource minus marginal cost should rise at the rate of discount. The work of Hotelling was extended to apply to the cartel model (Salant, 1976; Pindyck, 1979; Porter, 1983; Green and Porter, 1984) . In this part we discuss the mathematical model used to explore how OPEC members choose oil extraction levels to attain their goals. We also solve for the optimal time path of extracted quantities of oil, using the residual demand that OPEC faces and a previously derived OPEC cost function. This part also reports the simulation results of the model solution.
IV.1. Mathematical Model of OPEC
There is a rich literature on the process of oil price determination, but the question of whether OPEC is a cartel or not remains hotly debated. Economists have devoted much attention to this issue, since it reflects different arguments regarding OPEC's role in determining oil prices. Some economists have assumed OPEC as a monopolist and others use models that regard OPEC as a dominant firm. 8 As mentioned before, OPEC is assumed to act as a dominant firm, and non-OPEC countries are regarded as fringe firms. The main concern here is to explore the objective function for OPEC, and how OPEC determines the time path of production. This section of the chapter applies optimal control theory to study the dynamics of oil prices and Following Wirl (2008) , the hypothesis in this research is that OPEC countries do not pursue strict profit maximization. Indeed, they also seek political support among their people.
These countries realize that the Wes depends on OPEC's oil; this gives them some power of influence. The people of these countries frequently express anti-Western sentiments. 9 For this reason, OPEC countries in need of popular domestic support may take production decisions to gain such support. The statements and interviews that we read and watch for Ahmadi Nejad of Iran and Chavez of Venezuela are good examples of these policies. Even countries considered to be allies must still secure the support of their people, some of whom also have anti-Western sentiments. Such countries (allies) may adopt a moderate anti-Western policy.
With the political consideration in mind, OPEC countries will be assumed to maximize the net present value of benefits, where benefits are derived from oil profits as well as political support, based on the degree to which the west is harmed. OPEC countries maximize the net present value of benefits. Benefits have two parts: current profits from oil, π t , and political support among citizens of the country, S t . Political support is a function of the adverse effect on the West of higher oil prices, so S t is the harm function. 10 This harm function depends on the quantity of oil extracted and supplied to the market, and on an indicator, α t , that measures the desire of OPEC to harm the West.
The harm function can be written as: S t = f (q t ; α t )
where political support increases when output is reduced (∂S t /∂q t < 0), and when the desire to harm is strong (∂S t /∂α t > 0). This harm function applies even for those countries who consider themselves U.S. allies in the region such as the Saudi's or the Kuwaiti's, since decision makers in OPEC do care about their peoples' support. It should be noted that the harm function in this research differs from Wirl's work, where his harm function is based on the deviation of the current demand from the long run demand. Furthermore, Wirl's model is an infinite time horizon model that does not assume a finite stock of nonrenewable resource. Also this work solves and uses simulation methods to test the model, which Wirl does not.
The above harm function is incorporated in the model, which is then calibrated to determine the value of α t, . This is done by solving the optimization problem, simulating extraction quantities based on different values of α t, , and then comparing the simulated quantities to the actual extracted quantities to find the value of α t, that best aligns the two time paths. Based on these theoretical notions, the objective function for OPEC can be written as:
Max 0 ∫ T e -rt {P t (q t ) q t -C t (q t ) + f (q t ; α t )}.dt (10) subject to:
X 0 =X (12) T is free (13) where; (11) is the equation of motion, (12) is the initial stock of oil, and (13) states that the terminal time T will be determined endogenously. To solve this model, the Hamiltonian function becomes:
This Hamiltonian can be solved and the resulting optimization conditions can be interpreted. Also, because the residual demand function that OPEC faces is derived as well and the cost function of OPEC is specified, one can numerically solve the model.
IV.2. The Mathematical Harm Function
The general form of the harm function is: S t = f (q t ; α t ). OPEC is able to harm the western countries and the U.S. by cutting production and raising the price. Recall that OPEC has direct control over quantity not price, as the latter is determined in the market.
Pure profit maximization would normally require OPEC to set an output level where MR> 0 (assuming MC > 0). If the residual demand is linear, a further cut in output to raise the market price and harm the West would reduce profits. But this may occur if OPEC countries derive greater domestic political support by harming the West. The political support (S t ) will increase as (q t ) is cut or if the desire to harm (α t ) is stronger. This means:
Using these notions, a simple form of the harm function with appropriate properties is:
Equation (17) implies that the harm decreases when OPEC increases quantities (one in the denominator avoids the case of infinity when quantity is zero). Also the harm increases with a higher desire to harm, α t . If OPEC has no desire to harm anyone, then α t = zero and the harm function vanishes, meaning that OPEC just maximizes profits like any other producer in any market with no other considerations in mind.
IV.3. The Solution for the Mathematical Model of OPEC
With the estimated residual demand, estimated cost function and the assumed harm function, now we can proceed to solve the model representing OPEC's behavior.
a) The residual demand is: 
c) The harm function is:
These functions now are used to write the objective function of OPEC. 
X 0 = 400,686, as of 1970 (in million barrels)
T is free (25) This gives the following Hamiltonian: 
where, 0 ∫ T q t = 400,686
Differentiating equation (27) with respect to (t) gives:
-r e -rt {(389.62 -0.028 q t ) + 1.22 -0.00006 q t -α t / (1 + q t ) 2 }+ e -rt {( -0.028 ∂q t /∂t -0.00006
This gives:
Equation (30) shows the time path of quantity. This path shows that as αt increases (more desire to harm) the quantity will decrease. 
Also (T) is free, which means that H (T) =
Equation (35) indicates that OPEC will end-up with quantities not extracted in the last period (T). This means the harming function is forcing OPEC not to extract all reserves.
To proceed further, we use Microsoft Excel to solve the model numerically over 150 years and perform sensitivity analysis. For the sensitivity analysis, the discount rate is varied between 5%, 10% and 15% while the harm indicator, α t , goes from zero (no harm) to a very high value. The solution shows that a very high harm indicator value is consistent with OPEC's behavior as compared to no harm policy (α t = 0), in which the net present value does increase.
When α t is zero or low, the oil extraction stops very early depending on the discount rate used (optimal terminal time varies between 13 -20 years). But with a very high α t the time path extends to 140-147 years. 11 When comparing the actual extracted quantities to the simulated ones, the results show that with high harm indicators, α t , the simulated quantities are closer to the actual ones (e.g. for α t = 1E+20 the simulated quantities do not exceed the actual extracted quantities when the discount rate r is 10%).
With a high harm indicator values, OPEC also harms itself financially. The extent of this financial sacrifice to inflict damage on the West may be calculated by comparing the net present value of OPEC profits when α t is high with the net present value of OPEC profits when α t = 0. Tables 6 and 7 report the net present value of losses that OPEC suffers with relatively high values for α t , using discount rates of 5% and 10%. The losses range from about 10% to 20% for this variation in discount rates. The result suggests that OPEC appears to be accepting considerable monetary set-backs to appease its citizens by harming the West.
Under the assumption that our model is otherwise reliable, these outcomes can provide some evidence that OPEC members do consider harming the western countries as part of their goal when deciding on the extracted levels of oil. This means that OPEC members take into account the support of their people, and this affects their decisions about oil extraction. These results can explain, in part, some of the oil cuts taken by OPEC when world economy is in recession and such cuts could make the recovery harder and even cause financial losses to OPEC.
V. Conclusions
Two oil price shocks changed the pattern of cheap oil. The first was the Arab embargo on oil exports in 1973, in which oil prices rose five fold. In 1978, the second was the fall of Shah Iran. 11 The results and tables are available upon request from the authors.
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